In the spring and early summer of 1790, a new and formidable political association appeared in Paris dedicated to the consolidation of the Revolutionary gains of the previous year and to the development, propagation and implementation of Enlightened social and political ideals. The Societe de 1789 was founded by the marquis de Condorcet and abbe Sieyes in April 1790, and quickly attracted a large number of members from the leadership of the National Assembly, prominent intellectuals, financiers, Parisian politicians and ancien regime jurists and bureaucrats. 2 The membership list of the club suggests that the founders had assembled a workable coalition of political and intellectual moderates in 1790, including political figures such as Bailly, La Fayette, Mirabeau, Le Chapelier, Talleyrand, Thouret and La Rochefoucauld, and intellectuals such as Lavoisier, Suard, Tracy, Cabanis and DuPont de Nemours. Its meetings were very well at-tended by members of the National Assembly and influential Parisians and reported in several journals, such as the Moniteur and the Chronique de Paris. By June, the Chronique reported that the Societe 'devient chaque jour plus nombreuse et plus brillante: elle compte parmi ses membres beaucoup de deputes a l'Assemblee nationale, d'hommes de lettres distingues, et de personnes qui ont donne, dans la Revolution, des preuves de patriotisme et de zele ' . 3 The Societe de 1789 was widely seen to be a breakaway faction from the Jacobin club formed to provide a moderate political base, which seemed to be in a very strong position by the summer of 1790.
The subsequent failure of the Societe de 1789 to survive more than a year or to establish a workable political programme that had a direct influence on the course of events is both surprising and instructive. At the outset, the prestige and capability of the membership of the club would have led one to assume, as many did, that this group was willing and able to assume a leadership role in the Revolution. Even very hostile critics such as Prudhomme acknowledged the 'grands noms et grand talens' in the club.' There is a number of reasons why the club failed in its political as well as ideological functions. It was weak, divided, unable to attract a popular following and, most importantly, not a political party, in contrast to the Jacobins. The failure of the Societe is an equally important episode in understanding the relationship of the late Enlightment to the French Revolution. 5 The Societe de 1789 was a political club organized by two leading intellectuals of the day and shared many characteristics with earlier forms of political and intellectual sociability.
Indeed, one of the characteristics that marks the Societe de 1789 was the denial of its obvious political role by its founders and its constitution. The founders claimed the club would be a kind of 'Enlightenment Academy of Polities'. Condorcet suggested that it would be 'une compagnie d'amis des hommes, et, pour ainsi dire, d'agens du commerce des verites sociales'.' Direct political involvement would hurt the internationalism of the Societe, since national division would generate discord and the 'spirit of sects' that arise in the political arena. Thus, the Societe de 1789 ought to remain, in Condorcet's opinion, an institution 'plus philosophique encore que politique'. 7 Several considerations contributed to this rhetorical stance. Denying political goals was certainly advantageous in the light of the general distrust of party politics. Factionalism and party organizations were frequently decried because they led to corruption and favouritism, and because they promoted particular interests over the general will. 8 In addition, the prestige of a close identification with the Enlightenment, would add to the reputations of the individuals whom it wished to attract and place its enemies in the position of having to attack the Enlightenment as well as moderate policies. The rational politics of the Enlightenment would not have to be sullied by common political concerns. Finally, the apolitical rhetoric of the club may have come as part of a belief that the elimination of party spirit was both necessary and desirable. Condorcet's elaborate writings on the necessity of 'rational politics' was echoed in the intellectual justification of the new club.
There is little doubt, however, that the Societe was a political club. From its public announcement in April 1790, both the supporters and opponents of the Societe thought it was a political organization. Many of the bestknown members, such as La Fayette, had definite political interests in supporting the club. It is true that open political activities of the club were marginal, consisting of frequent, and lavish, patriotic dinners. Informally, however, the club served as a meeting ground for moderates, and a place to negotiate coalitions of moderates for the formation of a ministry and/or garnering control of the Assembly. The club's meetings and speeches, as in the case of the Jacobins, focused on current events and the political debates of the Assembly. The collapse of the Societe was, not surprisingly, due to the failure of the club to establish and maintain a significant political following in Paris and the provinces. For a political club that denied its political role, the Societe de 1789 suffered a most political demise -failure to attract a large partisan following.
The foundation of a club or society like the Societe de 1789 was not an uncommon activity in early 1790. Indeed, the years leading up to the Revolution had seen an unprecedented growth in secret, private and semi-private clubs established in the English style, which combined 'eating, whistplaying and reading all the latest books'. 9 As the crisis of the monarchy deepened, politics became the main focus of these clubs, as well as of the salons held by more or less fashionable hostesses, such as Madame de Condorcet. Accompanying the flood of political writing that presaged the French Revolution as well as the failure of the old institutions monitoring the press, was an even greater deluge of political talk. Not surprisingly, the forms of sociability inherited from the ancien regime continued to predominate in clubs founded during the early Revolutionary period.
Before the Revolution, the clubs were one forum where 'the aristocracy mingled with the high bourgeoisie, and social distinctions were sometimes forgotten'. 10 The Societe de 1789 combined many of the ancien regime models of sociability: the academy, the lodge, the salon and the literary society. Its members were already linked by ties of friendship and by interlocking memberships in pre-Revolutionary associations." The formal and public nature of the Societe de 1789 represents a small part of an important development in political sociability, since previous private associations had been illicit or unofficial. 12 Since the 1760s, there had been a growing number of extra-governmental associations, including 'cercles, musees, clubs, societes litteraires, cabinets de lecture et . . . loges francmac.onnes'. 13 Nevertheless, the 'democratic sociability' that pervaded many extra-governmental organizations during the ancien regime provided necessary experience in forming institutions where rank was of secondary importance. Equality within extra-governmental associations was not limited only to secret societies. Daniel Roche argues that, despite the official exclusion of all politics in their discussions, all of the academies of France, from the most prestigious in Paris to modest provincial institutions, provided an ideal of service civique that assumed Tintegration sociale des gens cultives'.' 4 Freed of government supervision at the beginning of the Revolution -though not of the suspicions of enemies fearing plots against liberty -political clubs, circles and associations flourished. Even the most elitist of the institutions, such as the Societe de 1789, adopted egalitarian rules of membership and procedure that had been learned during the ancien regime.
The origins of the Societe de 1789 are not difficult to determine. The club officially constituted itself on 12 April 1790, with the circulation of a prospectus and list of founding members. The list of 416 founding members, the clearly written constitution and idealistic prospectus all suggest that the club had been meeting for some time before its public declaration. 15 The Societe de 1789 was widely believed to be an offshoot of the Societe des Amis de la Constitution -the Jacobins -reflecting the first of many internal conflicts that would buffet this famous club. 16 This is probably true, but needs to be qualified by the fact that Condorcet, one of the founders and most influential members of the Societe de 1789, wrote that the Societe -or some other club -had been meeting since October 1789."
There is, however, little doubt that by January 1790 the club that would become the Societe de 1789 was meeting regularly in the houses of prominent Parisians and, at the end of the month, at a local hotel. Sieyes wrote the following note to M. Bancal des Issarts: 'Le Club de 1789, ou vous etes recu, tiendra sa premiere assemblee generale lundi, 18, a 8 heures du soir chez M. Perier, rue Chaussee d'Antin, no. 72. Prevenez ceux vous savez etre recus.'" What transpired in those sessions is unknown but there is evidence that the club continued to meet. In February 1790, the Actes des Apdtres listed a number of members of 1789 who had dined 'hier dimanche 14 en comite de constitution, hotel de la Propagande, rue de Richelieu, no. 158'." In early April, the Apdtres printed a note from Roederer to Sieyes, under the title EFFETS PERDUS, requesting a meeting of ten founding members of the Societe to discuss the judiciary 'ce soir vers neuf heures chez vous'. 20 The first indication that this rather informal association was becoming a larger, more organized club is the appearance of the Sieyes identified / 'art social as the human science whose goal was the improvement of mankind in political, economic and social areas. 24 He went on to outline the organization of the club, proposing that it should have a library, dining room, a journal and a series of committees dealing with the study, development and application of I'art social. The committees that Sieyes envisaged for the Societe de 1789 were as follows:
Premiere Section.
Des Principes de l'Art Social. Seconde Section.
Du Journal. Troisieme Section.
De la Correspondance francoise. Quatrieme Section.
Correspondance etrangere. Cinquieme Section.
D'information exacte. Sixeme Section.
D'encouragement.
The tone of the club was set by the selection and order of the sections or committees. Conspicuous by their absence were sections concerned with politics, membership, fund raising and other mundane elements that would be commonly associated with a political club or, to use modern American parlance, a political action committee. Indeed, influence as described by the Ebaucbe had little to do with the political process or the exercise of direct political influence on the representatives, but rather seems to have involved the cultivation of public opinion. Discussion of Enlightenment political ideas was the primary occupation of the club.
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The size of the club was to be limited to 660 members. Sieyes argued that a club of this size was necessary: 'II faut beaucoup de monde pour une semblable entreprise, & pour acquerir l'etendue d'influence qu'elle exige'. 26 The Societe de 1789, from its earliest foundation, was not to be either a mass political party nor even a large-scale club, but a pressure group made up of influential, enlightened individuals. According to the Ebauche, membership would be tightly controlled, 27 excluding men who were suspect in their 'doctrine ou leurs sentimens patriotiques' or those whose reputations, merited or not, would detract from the useful influence of the club. 21 Sieyes was almost completely blind to the importance of mass politics that was being exhibited by the early radical clubs of the sections and by the Jacobins," for while the Societe de 1789 was large in comparison to the clubs and associations of the ancien regime, it could not, according to its constitution, mobilize mass support.
In theory, the Societe de 1789 would not participate directly in the political process, for there was no institutional provision within the club for active intervention in the politics of regenerating France. The model used for the Societe was a cross between the salon and the academy, and its goal was to raise the general level of political discussion in France and abroad. The club was not meant, according to Sieyes's description, to serve as a political party that would propose a platform and attempt to secure its implementation by trying to get its members elected to the legislative branch or through a pressure group (or political action committee) which would lobby members of the legislature or executive. Any impact the Societe would have on the political process would be indirect, by opening public discussion of issues and enlightening the electorate and representatives. By disseminating political 'truths' the club would not be aimed at particular pieces of legislation but at the broadest formulation of I'art social, which enlightened legislators would implement in policy.
A couple of weeks after Sieyes published the Ebauche, the 3 ' The global commerce of enlightened ideas, akin to the global patterns of commerce, was required for progress, by which 'nous pouvons nous rendre si superieurs aux anciens'. Thus, it was highly desirable to 'multiplier entre les nations les echanges reciproques des connoissances humaines'.
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From its constitution and early descriptions, it is clear that the Societe de 1789 was modelled after ancien regime forms of sociability, particularly the academy, according to which the club was to be the meeting place of an enlightened elite. 33 Although it admitted members who were not " See Jack Censer's discussion of the early radical press and its relationship to the clubs forming in the sections, Prelude to power: the Parisian radical press, 1789-91 (Baltimore, Md, 1976 Similarly, the image of an international academy is suggested by the fact that foreign potentates were invited to become honorary members of the club, including Stanislaus, 33 Washington and Franklin. In seeking the honorary membership and support of a foreign prince, the Societe de 1789 continued an ancien regime tradition of scientific and literary academies seeking the patronage of men of influence. This tradition grew out of the close alliance between the academies and the monarchy during the ancien regime.
The founders of the Societe de 1789 failed to organize the machinery of a political party and find ways to foster and mobilize mass support. Influenced by the belief that factions were inherently destructive and that rational, enlightened discussion was a superior alternative to political rivalries, the club was organized more as an academy than as a political party. The rhetoric of the Societe, which stressed its non-partisan nature, was partially a smoke-screen to hide a real political agenda, but was also believed by many members who shared Condorcet's vision of a rational political system where clear discussion would lead to the rule of 'common reason'. The constitution and prospectus of 1789 made a conscious effort to connect to Enlightened political and social thought with efforts to consolidate the gains of the Revolution of 1789.
II
The founders of the Societe de 1789 gave the club a broad mandate. It was to serve as a clearing house for Enlightened political and social ideas at the national and international level; monitor, if not become involved in, debates concerning the constitution and establishment of order in France; and educate France and the rest of Europe in the principles of Enlightened and representative government. Its activities were, in short, to be as wide ranging as those of its intellectual forbears, to touch on a broad array of issues, from the abstract to the useful. Condorcet's discussion on the competing interests of Paris and the provinces was followed, in the same number of the Journal, by Hassenfratz's 'Observations sur les mines'." The Societe carried on the Enlightened tradition of combining the theoretical and the useful without clear distinction in much the same way as Diderot mixed philosophical and technical articles in the Encyclopedic All subjects were open to scientific examination and rational analysis.
The most significant common thread in the writings of Societe is the emphasis on reason in politics. Condorcet's notion of the common or public reason was the key to his political and social theories from well before the Revolution. In his reception speech to the French Academy on 21 February 1782 he suggested that 'en meditant sur la nature des sciences morales, on ne peut, en effet, s'empe"cher de voir qu'appuyees comme les sciences physiques sur l'observation des faits, elles doivent suivre la merae methode, acquerir une langue egalement exacte et precise, acquerir un meme degre de certitude'." He believed that reason in the form of scientific method could be applied to human activity and result in the same precision as natural science. It was towards this end that Condorcet developed a form of mathematique sociale 3 ' which could be applied to political decision-making. The certainty of the moral sciences opened the possibility of a political organization that would harmonize rational interests in the Common Reason: 39 Le projet de rendre tous les hommes vertueux est chimerique: mais pourquoi ne verrait-on pas un jour les lumieres, jointes au genie, creer pour les generations plus heureuses une methode d'education, un systeme de lois qui rendraient presque inutile le courage de la vertu? Dirige par ces institutions salutaires, l'homme n'aurait besoin que d'ecouter la voix de son coeur et celle de sa raison, pour remplir par un penchant naturel les memes devoirs qui lui coutent aujourd'hui des efforts et des sacrifices.
The sufficiently careful and reasonable creation of political institutions would allow the rule of reason without requiring a distinct moral character. Condorcet was concerned not merely to find the will of the greatest number of men in an assembly or a tribunal, but also to obtain results in collective decisions that were most conformable to the truth. Power, for Condorcet, was to be a function of truth and reason, and not of majority will. While Condorcet might have been the most important theorist of rational politics, he was by no means isolated. Philippe-Antoine Grouvelle argued that philosophical methods of reasoning should be the model for debates in representative bodies, a notion premised on the view that a law was 'une verite mise en action': 41 J'ai vu quelquefois des philosophes se reunir pour discuter des matieres epineuses. Quelle etoit leur methode? Us commenc,oient par definir les mots, puis rapprochoient soigneusement toutes les notions positives du sujet, pour les comparer avec la nature des choses, et ne reduisoient la question a des elemens simples, qu'apres l'avoir considered sous le double rapport des principes inviolables, et des convenances necessaires. Si un scrupuleux amour du vrai suffit seul pour inspirer de telles precautions, dans la recherche d'une verite speculative, que doit-on faire lorsqu'il s'agit de poser les fondemens d'une loi, c'est-a-dire, d'une verite mise en action.
Indeed, many laws required the consideration of a 'foyer de lumieres concentrees' since the issues under debate were at least as complex as those speculative problems that philosophers examined. Grouvelle's opinion should not be discounted as the idle writings of a marginal figure who was not speaking for the club. He was a secretary of the club, editor with Condorcet of the Journal, as well as a frequent contributor. The Enlightened conception of reason informed many of the political ideas of the members of the Societe de 1789. Many accepted the proposition that scientific method, properly applied to public institutions and policy, could lead to harmonious and beneficial rule.
The frequency and seeming extremity of the declarations that politics could be reduced to an exact science is surprising. The chemist and tax farmer Lavoisier, for example, opened one of his discussions of the assignats with the assertion that it was time to assemble the truths from the debate and draw the consequences: 42 Aujourd'hui que la discussion, apres avoir fait etinceler la lumiere de toutes parts, ne ramene plus que les memes argumens, il est temps de rassembler les verites eparses & de tirer des consequences. Posons d'abord les faits qui sont convenus entre tous les partis: car dans ces sortes de discussions, ou chacun n'a pour objet que de chercher la verite, il faut marcher ensemble le plus longtemps qu'il est possible & ne se separer qua la derniere extremite.
Lavoisier's method was to start from agreed upon facts and to assume that everyone in the debate was looking for the truth. The possibility that in a debate where so many important players could gain or lose significant amounts of money in a speculative enterprise, defending individual, regional or social interests might be a primary motivation, or that any solution would be a matter of power and influence rather than truth, does not seem to have been taken seriously by Lavoisier. Similarly, Cerutti attacked the opponents of the assignats for not being rational, even though 'les finances en etoient la science exacte et la geometrie' of government and politics. 'Cette geometrie', he wrote, 43 manque a la plupart de ceux qui ecrivent aujourd'hui sur les finances. Us semblent ne produire que les romans de l'esperance ou les satyres du desespoir. C'est faute d'idees simples et precises. Je vais done commencer par eclaircir les trois questions sur lesquelles porte la dispute, et par donner des notions exactes . . .
The role of reason in the Revolution for Cerutti seems to have been paramount. In defending the nationalization of church lands, he argued that the abuses of the clergy were the main reason for the accumulation of so much wealth, and that attempts to prevent the loss of their lands by threatening universal destruction would fail because 'la population credule est devenue un Peuple raisonneur'. 44 Two assumptions underlay the optimism of Lavoisier and Cerutti in reaching true conclusions to such an intractable problem: that politics and government were subject to rational analysis and programmes; and that the Revolution was, to a certain extent, the creation of a rational government, led by Enlightened men and motivated by an Enlightened nation.
Cerutti greeted the new political order, in 1789, with the declaration that the French were substituting 'enfin la raison publique aux opinions factieuses, et des idees justes a des idees fausses ou exagerees'. 45 Similarly, the marquis de Casaux outlined a notion of the 'general reason' in his discussion of the constitution. He wrote that 'une Loi doit toujours etre la declaration du resultat de toutes les connoissances qu'il est possible de recueillir sur l'objet a l'egard duquel il est necessaire de statuer'.
46 Though he did not, in this text, refer directly to the notion of the common or public reason, Casaux mentioned the critical importance of the accumulation of reason in legislative bodies on a number of occasions. 'Le pouvoir legislatif, he declared, 'reside essentiellement et uniquement dans la masse de lumieres qui existent dans la Nation, et il n'est possible de recueillir ces lumieres que dans le Conseil, compose de Representants de tous les interests'."' Casaux asserted the connection between lumieres and liberty in absolute terms: 'sans lumieres point de liberte, sans liberte point de lumieres, sans lumieres et liberte, point de propriete, point d'Assemblee Nationale'. 48 The general pronouncements of the desirability of reasonableness in political behaviour and the foundation of political sovereignty on constructions such as the 'public reason' were politically loaded notions in 1790. The contrast was drawn by a number of writers between the reason required of the National Assembly and the irrationality of those who attacked the Assembly or other elite groups. The politics of reason and truth found particular application to the defence of the parties of order in 1790 and must be interpreted in that context.
Grouvelle opened his discussion of the decree of 18 June 1790 suppressing the nobility and exterior signs of nobility with the declaration that law was not merely an expression of the general will, but also must be the view of the public reason: 'la loi ne devroit pas etre seulement l'expression de la volonte generate, mais il lui convient sur-tout d'etre le voeu de la raison publique. Voila pourquoi il faut qu'une discussion etendue et solemnelle lui serve comme d'une preface necessaire.' 49 Grouvelle went on to argue that if legislators did not deliberate carefully and rationally, they would be acting as despots, who frequently confused truth and the movement of the passions. The National Assembly had the right to form decrees, but it also had the duty to discuss, for there was no 'proposition assez simple pour n'avoir pas besoin d'etre demontree. Une Assemblee Nationale est faite pour prouver que deux et deux font quatre, si quelqu'un le nie.' 50 The public reason was determined in the debates of the National Assembly which, it would seem, could reach conclusions that demonstrated the truth of proposed laws. And by implication Grouvelle suggested that these demonstrations could be as clear and as simple as the proofs of deux et deux font quatre. The legislators had a further duty to disseminate these truths to the population as a whole. The interest of the people, he argued, was best served by freeing them of their prejudices, instructing them of The representatives of the nation were not only to preserve the 'national common sense' but were supposed to serve as the purveyors of 'social truths'. Grouvelle wrote: 52 les representans de la nation ne sont pas seulement les architectes de l'edifice constitutionnel, ils doivent etre aussi les heraults des verites sociales. Le senat, le conseil de souverainete, est encore un areopage, un tribunal d'opinions, qui doit fletrir les erreurs dangereuses, denoncer les prejuges anticiviques a la conscience et a la raison de tous les citoyens.
Thus, the two principal functions of the National Assembly both entailed the operations of rational government. The first, the creation of a constitution, would allow decrees to be nothing more than the 'proclamation des axiomes philosophiques'. More importantly, the National Assembly would serve as protector of the public reason by disseminating enlightenment to the population. It was because the people, Grouvelle went on to claim, 'n'est point eclaire qu'il faut montrer la lumiere; c'est parce qu'il n'est point sensible aux atteintes portees a ses droits et a sa dignite, que ses mandataires reclameront pour lui'. 53 Grouvelle suggested that reason in a collective form was central to the creation of a free government. It was, however, a strictly elitist argument in favour of maintenance of the new political arrangements, since it presupposed an enlightened elite to enact and operate rational government. Opposition to the government was categorized as charlatanisme, or irrationality. Grouvelle's emphasis on the role of reason in the political realm carried with it a strong defence of existing social distinctions.
The rhetorical uses of the Society's view of political reason are important to consider, for it is here that the tensions between representative rule of the people and the rule of an enlightened elite comes to the fore. Grouvelle isolated the tensions of the Enlightenment conception of reason in politics when he wrote that a complex proposal 'a la verite, ne peut sortir d'une assemblee nombreuse! Car la foule juge, mais ne concoit point. L'empire du genie est oligarchique de sa nature. II faut compter les voix, mais peser les avis; et c'est en pareil cas, qu'un homme n'en vaut pas un autre.' 54 The contrast between counting voices and weighing opinions, where one man was not the same as the next, formed an important subtext to the discussions of the Societe, and provided the underpinnings of the defence of the emerging constitution and the authority of the National Assembly.
The politics of reason in 1790 seemed to have failed to account for the importance of irrational forces in political behaviour, and was marred by association with the ancien regime .The ideals of Vart social and rational politics tended to legitimate the claims that such an elite group made to retain its hold on bureaucratic, financial and cultural power. In its attempt to continue the culture of ancien regime politics, the Societe de 1789 developed political theories which did not correspond to the aspirations of more radical elements in Paris. The politics of reason in 1790 were those of the salon and drawing-room, not the meeting hall and the section. By discounting political rhetoric and declaring political passions as simple illegitimate irrationality, the Societe failed to confront the new political culture of the Revolution. The failure was both intellectual and political. The composition of the club led naturally to elitist notions of politics which were reinforced by an intellectual tradition derived from the Physiocratic tradition of the Enlightenment. Men like Condorcet, Grouvelle, Du Pont and Lavoisier sincerely believed in the development of rational government, but they also benefited from a theory which would have left an intellectual and social elite intact. Thus, the influence of Enlightened notions of rational government on the political theories of the Societe de 1789 was complicated by intellectual concerns as well as the interests of groups wishing to promote their own causes. The club thus attracted Enlightenment liberals as well as those who feared that the Revolution would degenerate into anarchy.
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The membership of the Societe de 1789 was composed, for the most part, of wealthy and influential men, reflecting the efforts of Condorcet and Sieyes to establish an Enlightened elite which could stabilize and consolidate the gains of 1789-The members were attracted to the club for a number of reasons. Many would have been attracted by the prospectus which stressed the original public motivations for establishing the club: the elaboration and dissemination of Enlightened social and political ideals. Thus, joining the club can to some extent be considered an act of support for such ideals. The practical political focus of the Societe -forming an opposition to the Jacobins, supporting moderate efforts to restore orderwas less explicitly mentioned by the founders of the club, but would also have proved attractive to many members. Most of the individuals who joined the club in the spring of 1790 probably did so because they believed that the club would provide a forum for the rational discussion of political matters and that the Societe would be a force to restore order and halt the Revolution which they thought had accomplished most of its objectives.
The membership of the Societe de 1789 was drawn from ancien regime elites, includingparlementaires, members of the academies, intellectuals, financiers, soldiers, aristocrats and bureaucrats. The intellectual goals and political moderation of the Societe attracted members of many of the traditional elites. The clear identification of the Enlightenment with the Revolution made by members of the club suggests that the late Enlightenment's transformation from a movement of political opposition to a force for reform in the institutions of the monarchy 55 continued into the Revolution. As the Enlightenment became respectable and, beginning with Turgot's ministry, more politically active, the programmes of reform gained more influence in many circles.
The membership list published by the club in April 1790 contains 416 names. This was over 200 members fewer than the 660 members that the club could enrol and that Mazzei suggests had joined by mid-June 1790.
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The membership list published by the club may have been an attempt to impress upon Paris and the nation that the Societe de 1789 was attracting important and influential people in large numbers. Only ten members of the 420 members were drawn from the ranks of the first estate, including Sieyes, Talleyrand and Jean-Baptiste Dumouchel, rector of the Universite de Paris. There were, of course, several Protestant clergymen, including Rabaut Saint-Etienne, but these must be classified as part of the third estate. Ninety members of the Societe de 1789 were former nobles or, more correctly, former members of the second estate, in 1790. Finally, 210 members of the Societe de 1789 were members of the third estate, leaving 110 members unclassified.
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Not surprisingly, the political activity of the membership was very high. Nearly one-fifth (eighty-two) of the membership were deputies or alternates to the National Assembly. This figure is probably low, since it was only after the publication of the membership list that the Societe offered free membership to deputies of the National Assembly. Representation in the Societe was not evenly distributed among the estates, for only two of the Societe's deputies to the Estates General had been elected to represent the first estate, while twenty-nine members represented the nobility and thirty-eight were from the third estate. Thus, the club drew more members " The relatively high proportion of individuals of unidentified social category is a result of the information provided in the membership list which typically included only the last name and a general street address for the member, though the latter information was not always provided. Problems of identification are discussed in Olsen, 'The politics of Enlightenment', pp. 164-7. from deputies of the second estate, as a percentage of deputies in the National Assembly, than from either the first estate or the third. The Societe attracted a large proportion of liberal aristocrats in the National Assembly, along with an important contingent of deputies elected by the third estate. This suggests that the moderates in 1790 were attempting to continue the coalition between liberal aristocrats and influential members of the third estate which had been created by the Patriotes before the Revolution.
The members of the Societe de 1789 were also very active in Parisian municipal politics. Forty-nine members of the Societe served as electors in Paris between 1789 and 1791, and twelve of these were elected to the Estates General. Most electors were typically local notables who were active in politics and favourably viewed by the majority of active citizens (in 1790 and 1791) in their districts. While the political role of electors changed from 1789 to 1791, our interest in the members of the Societe de 1789 who were elected to the Electoral Assemblies is related to opinion in local districts concerning particular groups. The number of members of the Societe de 1789 who served as Paris electors increased during the period: twenty-six future members of the club were elected in 1789, twentythree in 1790 and thirty-nine in 1791. Eighty-eight terms as elector were filled by sixty members of the Societe de 1789, suggesting that the role played by club members was due less to personal tenure than to the appeal of moderates in the wealthier districts of Paris."
As in the Estates General, liberal professions and office-holders predominated in the socio-occupational composition of the Societe de 1789." There were few manufacturers or owners of manufacturing concerns in the club. Unlike the National Assembly, however, it was financiers and bankers who were by far the largest group. Forty-four can be classified very broadly as bankers, representing some of the most important banking and exchange houses in the capital, including the Vandenyver, Walckiers, Thellusson, Ravel, Mallet, Lessert, Lecouteulx, Grand, Cottin, Boyd and Ker, and Berard. There are several possible reasons for the dominance of financiers and bankers in this breakdown. First, the Societe drew a large proportion of its members, except for the deputies of the National Assembly, from Paris, which was the financial centre of the nation. Further, since many of the financiers and bankers had significant amounts of money invested in government securities and paper, they would have seen the rise to power of a moderate and fiscally conservative group as an important guarantee of their interests. Many of the financiers were Genevan The membership of the Societe de 1789 was drawn from several ancien regime groups dependent on the government before the Revolution for their livelihoods and status: royal adminstrators, parlementaires, financiers, intellectuals (frequently members of certain academies) and nobles serving in the military. Contemporary commentators were conscious that many of the important members of the club had been influential in the government before the Revolution. Prudhomme, for example, summarized Du Pont's pre-Revolutionary career, as part of a blistering attack on the ministeriels found in the Societe de 1789, in a single comment: 'Dupont, vrai balai d'anti-chambre sous Turgot comme sous Brienne, sous Calonne comme sous Necker, et de plus membre du club de 1789.' 60 Further, Prudhomme argued that the club contained many 'jeunes ci-devant seigneurs et nos gens de lettres a pension sous l'ancien regime' 61 who were there to improve their fortunes by supporting the court against liberty.
There seems to have been enough truth to Prudhomme's charges to make them stick. With certain important exceptions, such as Brissot and Sieyes, most of the members of the Societe had been well established under the ancien regime. Indeed, the case of Du Pont, used by Prudhomme, was not unique among members of the Societe de 1789. Charles-Pierre-Paul Savalette de Langes (1746-97), for example, came from a family which was at the centre of royal financial administration; and Louis-Cesar-Alexandre Dufresne de Saint-Leon (1751 -1836) worked for Savalette in the 1770s and 1780s." Thus, the charge by Prudhomme and others of a cosy relationship between ministers and members of the Societe de 1789 was, like most good political invective, accurate enough to be effective, although this does not, by itself, suggest that the club was formed or financed by the ministry.
Royal administrators in the Societe de 1789 ranged from the most influential to individuals who occupied minor posts. Frequently, future members of the Societe entered into the government through family connections. Antoine-Leon-Anne Amelot de Chaillou (1760-1824) came from an important family involved in the Parlements and the royal bureaucracy since the time of Francis I. Personal connections were also important in gaining access to positions in the royal bureaucracy. Bertrand Dufresne No less than thirteen members of the Societe de 1789 were also members of the Academy of Sciences of Paris; thirteen were members of the Royal Society of Agriculture; six were in the Academie des Inscriptions et belleslettres; and five were among the 'immortals' of the Academie francaise. Members of the Societe de 1789 had also been in many other academies in France and abroad. David and Pajou had been admitted to the Academie de Peinture; Thouret, the brother of the four-time president of the National Assembly, had been admitted to the Medical Society of Paris; Cazaux was a corresponding member of the Royal Society in London and the Agricultural Society of Florence; Bitaube had been admitted to the Academy of Berlin; and Broussonet, the perpetual secretary of the Royal Society of Agriculture, was also a corresponding member of the Royal Society in London. The positions held by the most prominent intellectuals of the Societe de 1789 are well known: Condorcet had been employed for many years in the Mint, Lavoisier at the Salpetriere, Lacepede at the Jardin des Plantes and Bailly at the Observatory. These members were frequently well compensated by the monarchy as well, as in the case of Chamfort, who was named secretary to Madame Elisabeth (Louis XVI's sister) and given a pension of 2,000 livres during the 1780s. intellectuals who became members of the Societe de 1789 were part of a Parisian cultural elite that had become accustomed to manoeuvre in the salons of the powerful and to make appeals to the government. As the Enlightenment became institutionalized, the most successful intellectuals, such as Condorcet and Lavoisier, themselves became patrons and protectors of younger and frequently, although not always, less talented men.
Many of the intellectuals associated with the Societe de 1789 were members of the famous Masonic lodge, les Neuf Soeurs, during the years before the Revolution. 64 Masonic ties among members went far beyond the intellectuals, however, as no fewer than thirty-seven members of the 1789 club belonged to at least one lodge. 65 Members of the Neuf Soeurs included Bailly, Cabanis, Jean-Nicolas Demeunier (a royal censor and secretary to the due de Provence), Dufresne de Saint-Leon, Garat, Grouvelle, Lacepede, Moreau de Saint-Mery and Destutt de Tracy. Many members of the Societe de 1789 belonged to several lodges during the ancien regime, reflecting a significant commitment to the Masonic movement that stretched across social boundaries. Bertrand Barrere, the lawyer and future regicide from Toulouse, belonged to the lodges Encyclopedique and Toulouse. Alexandre-Francois-Marie, vicomte de Beauharnois, belonged to four lodges: La Purete, Saint Sophie, La Fidelite and Societe Olympique. JeanPaul Brissot, who had no claim to social position or rank, belonged to two lodges before the Revolution: La Fidelite and La Bienfaisance. While the Neuf Soeurs lodge was the most widely attended among members of the Societe de 1789, other lodges provided more than one member to the club. Five members of the 1789 club were members of Olympique de la Parfaite Estime, including Charles-Louis-Victor de Broglie, La Fayette's brother-inlaw, the marquis de Grammont, and the banker Lecouteulx de la Noraye. The extensive membership in Masonic lodges among members of the 1789 club does not, of course, suggest a conspiracy among members of the ancien regime elites. Rather, it suggests that Masonic democratic sociability provided yet another link among members of this elite group.
The Societe de 1789 recruited its members from the financial, cultural, adminstrative and political elite of the early Revolution. These men were not strangers to government patronage and activity before the Revolution. They had dealt with the monarchy of the last years of the ancien regime in a wide variety of functions. Even more striking is the degree to which they shared reform ideas before the Revolution. Reforming the royal administration and applying liberal ideas before the Revolution was important to a wide number of members of the Societe. This can be seen in La Rochfoucauld's Americanism, the liberalism of many of the expatriate financiers, and Pastoret's ideas of legal reform, 66 published in 1788 when the procureur general of the Parlement of Paris became maitre des requites. A liberal elite before the Revolution found, in the Societe de 1789, a very similar liberal elite in the early phases of the Revolution. Although few realized it in 1790, enlightened liberals would not be able to contain the Revolution. 'Political virtue' rather than adminstrative merit would be the hallmark of the following years.
IV
The actions of the Societe de 1789 certainly suggest a political faction more than a philosophic circle. The most publicized and impressive activities of the club were not lectures, debates or useful works. Rather, they were dinners and harangues by moderate political leaders. The first of these was in celebration of the opening of the club's lavish quarters in the Palais Royal. 67 On 15 May, the Moniteur carried a description of this meeting of 130 people held three days earlier. The article announced the formation of the Societe de 1789 -so named to 'consacrer l'annee de la revolution en France' -whose main goal was to develop, defend and propagate the principles of a free constitution and, in general, to lend its effort to the development of I'art social."
The Societe de 1789 was, from its inception, certainly the party of order. Mazzei frequently expressed his feelings that the maintenance of good order and peace was both urgently needed and difficult to obtain. For example, he wrote to Stanislaus on 10 September 1790 that 'the pains taken by good citizens to maintain peace and order are inexpressible! They are as edifying as the intrigues of the two rival parties are detestable, each of them out to find what it wants in universal disorder.' 69 The club itself stood for the maintenance of law and order. Andre Chenier published an essay entitled 'Avis au Peuple Francois sur ses veritables ennemis' in the Journal de la Societe de 1789 and as a separate pamphlet, in which he argued that the 'heat' and passion created by the just and legitimate insurrection threatened to destroy the entire Revolution. 70 All Frenchmen wanted to carry the flag, display their patriotism and have a say in the creation of the new regime. Agitation and demonstration would benefit the public good by exciting 'une sorte d'emulation patriotique'. But such agitation, if taken too far, would become the soil in which political hatred and factionalism could take root. If we perceive, Chenier commented, when describing the symptoms of political factionalism, This kind of social upheaval, though Chenier did not distinguish between political and social unrest, posed a grave danger to the public good, because it weakened the nation in a pointless anarchy and rendered the legislators less effective. Finally, with such disorder, it was more difficult to identify and isolate real public enemies. The unrest in France was based on false principles, but Chenier went on to ascribe a social component to these false principles, for the lower orders of society were not sufficiently educated or enlightened to reason properly or to deduce the true principles of the Revolution. He wrote, 72 a qui la pauvrete et une vie toute employee aux travaux du corps, n'ont pas permis de perfectionner leur entendement par ces longues reflexions, par cet apprentissage de la raison, par cette education de l'esprit, qui seule enseigne aux hommes a rappeler a des principes certains et simples toutes les actions de la vie humaine.
According to Chenier, the solution was simply to educate the people about the true principles of the Revolution: 'qu'il n'est de bonheur, de bien-etre, de contentement sur la terre, sans amour de l'ordre et de la justice, sans obeissance aux loix, sans le respect pour les proprietes'. 73 His fear of social disorder and the threat to property was well rooted in the social ideology of the Enlightenment, since the Philosopbes never trusted the 'people' to respect either reason or property. 74 The Lockean imperative of property as a guarantor of political rationality and interest was certainly one of the informing principles in Chenier's essay. Clearly, order for Chenier and the Societe de 1789 meant the preservation of existing social and economic distinctions, where property-owners would continue to control the political institutions.
The concerns of the Societe de 1789 were not, as suggested by Chenier's essay, purely abstract discussions of the threats to the Revolution. In 71 Ibid. " Ibid. p. 50. 74 See H. Payne, The Philosopbes and the people (New Haven, Conn., 1976).
September 1790, the Societe took a strong and unpopular public stand concerning the repression of the mutiny of the garrison at Nancy by General Bouille.
7
' The club expressed its gratitude and congratulations to the department of the Meurthe, the municipality of Nancy, the national militia and the troops of the line, whose 'fidelite courageuse a retabli la paix et les loix dans la ville de Nancy'. 76 The first pages of the communique were a blistering attack on the mutineers and on all seditious groups who counselled attacks on legitimate powers. These implacable and perverse enemies of the people had completely destroyed legal power by defaming all public officials, and rendered the representatives in the National Assembly suspect by forcing them to employ 'une rigueur necessaire'. Could the mutineers be considered Frenchmen, since they had broken the 'pacte social' that bound the nation together? No, the Societe declared, and the punishment of the 'enfans paricides, c'est le devoir sacre des vrais et fideles enfans de la patrie'. 77 The Societe congratulated the victors at Nancy, by pointing out that they had not only done their duty, but also pointed the way to the continued preservation of the nation, suggesting that the Societe approved of the use of force to crush all rebellions. The Societe declared that habitual hostility to authority would result in anarchy. 78 Thus, the restoration of order at Nancy was placed in the centre of a broader struggle to halt what the members of the Societe de 1789 saw as the threat of anarchy. Properly regulated by the constitution and the law, power was no longer inextricably linked to arbitrary action as it had been under the ancien regime. Rather, the exercise of legitimate power opened up the possibility of illegitimate revolts, a process which the Societe de 1789 felt was defined by the constitution. The club defended law and order by linking them to the process of drafting the constitution and to the individuals who were so engaged. Clearly, the Societe de 1789 wanted to confine the Revolution to the gains which were then being drafted into the constitution; these would define the law and limits of the legitimate use of power. While the constitution was being drafted, the National Assembly was the sole possessor of legitimate authority.
There was, however, a surprising lack of agreement on many of the issues being addressed by the club. Mazzei identified this as the central cause of its political impotence. The Italian resigned from the governing committee of the Societe de 1789 on 27 September 1790, although he remained a member during the next year, because he was dissatisfied with the progress of the club. Mazzei wrote that he had joined to promote the common good: 'But when inactivity, lack of energy and even union render talents and uprightness itself useless, a man made the way I am needs to wash his hands of it.'" On 29 November 1790, he again pointed out to Stanislaus that the talent and character of the members of the Societe de 1789 were certainly impressive, 'enough ... if there had been courage to make use of them and union ... to destroy forces much superior to those wicked extremists of the two parties could have mustered'. 80 Mazzei's stinging indictment was accurate.
The leadership of the Societe was split on both ideological and personal grounds. Although the club was committed to the preservation of the constitutional monarchy under Louis XVI and the ratification of such a constitution, many members were certainly not loyal to the Crown. Condorcet's ambiguous position concerning the monarchy in 1790 is a good case in point. In his most developed constitutional work, Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblies provinciates (1788), the king was given no noticeable role in the constitutional organization, and was, in fact, very rarely mentioned. Even when the Philosophe did mention the monarch in this treatise, it was always in a purely passive role." Condorcet would write in September 1792 that he had decried the absurdity and dangers of monarchy since July 1791, but he went on to assert that a republican could preserve monarchy until its treachery was clearly seen or until it could be eliminated without upheaval. 12 Condorcet's adherence to constitutional monarchy was questionable in 1790. He was willing to preserve the monarchy, but would have preferred, it would seem, a republic. Condorcet's ambivalence on a matter of such fundamental importance to the policies of the club he helped to create must be contrasted with the very strong pro-monarchical stances adopted by many other members of the Societe. Bailly, La Rochefoucauld and La Fayette all remained staunch constitutional monarchists. Thus, the leaders and founders of the Societe de 1789 did not agree even on issues as vital as the role of the monarch in France, hardly a good basis for an effective political pressure group.
By design, the club was made up of men of money, position and influence. They were actively trying to 'restore order' in a situation where political radicals and the lower classes were appropriating power to themselves. However, the authorities, and more particularly, certain ministers, created problems for moderates, since their actions and intentions were already suspect. In this context, Fillipo Mazzei wrote on 17 September 1790 to Stanislaus that the Societe was heavily involved in defending the policies of the current ministry, a dangerous course which could alienate popular opinion." A month later, Mazzei expressed his belief that the Societe de 1789 had indeed struck a poor alliance with a ministry that was either stupid or treasonous. Mazzei felt that, in any event, the Societe de 1789 was caught in a shrinking middle position between the Enrages and those 'idiots of aristocrats':
84
Our Club, besides lacking energy and activity, never was wary enough. The minister's conduct was no better and among the reasons for regret there is a very grave one against M. de la Luzerne who was unpardonably remiss in the Brest matter. Those idiots of aristocrats, for their part, miss no chance to show that they wish a counterrevolution and that they hope for it. Their pieces of imprudence are huge and numberless ... It is nothing to wonder at, therefore, if the extreme Enrages are winning since all the others are conspiring in their favour. I cannot get over it.
The problem, Mazzei argued, was not that there was resistance to restoring order in Paris and the provinces, but that every effort to halt the Revolution was identified with counter-revolution by the extremists; and supporters of the Crown, by their counter-revolutionary sympathies, gave ample reason for fear.
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This was, of course, the consistent complaint of many of the centrist groups formed during the Revolution. The defence of order, which the Societe de 1789 wanted to promote, as we shall see, was quickly used by radicals to attack the club. Mazzei, a shrewd observer of events, saw that the suspected complicity of the ministry in a potential reaction made the identification of the Societe de 1789 with the conservatives all the more persuasive and dangerous. But other than decrying conservatives for their shortsightedness and unproductive intransigence, there was little the Societe de 1789 could do, in Mazzei's opinion, to preserve the centre.
The Societe de 1789 attracted a number of formidable opponents on both poles of political opinion, none of whom was more vitriolic than Marat. Returning to France in May 1790, after having spent several months hiding from French authorities in England for his attacks on Necker, Marat continued his political agitation. On 14 July 1790, he published the Infernal projet des ennemis de la Revolution in pamphlet form, then reprinted it in L'Ami dn Peuple two days later. In this diatribe, Marat intimated that the Societe de 1789 was the centre of a vast political conspiracy to place political control of France in the hands of the enemies of the nation: 86 C'etait aux Jacobins que se preparaient les discussions et souvent les decrets de l'Assemblee nationale. Par une suite de sourdes menees des ennemis de la Revolution, toutes les affaires se sont portees au club de 1789. C'est la ou se prepare le travail de la cour et de l'Assemblee, mais les membres de ce club ne sont pas tous inities; c'est dans un comite secret que se traitent les grandes affaires, c'est la qu'on a resolu de changer totalement 1'administration, changement qu'on vient d'annoncer dans quelques feuilles du jour, pour y preparer les esprits.
Judging by Marat's description of who would be appointed to important positions in this new administration, it seems that he believed that many of the most prominent members of the Societe de 1789 were members of this secret committee. Like most good political invective, Marat's charge of a 'secret committee' was not entirely inaccurate. Mazzei mentions some kind of separate reunion permitted by the Societe made up of members who broke away from the Jacobins during the summer: 'since there were about 30 who were also members of the National Assembly, our Society allowed them to meet by themselves in our rooms if they thought it advisable'.
87
What was discussed in these separate meetings is unknown, but Marat was certainly willing to speculate that those present were planning to form a new ministry. 88 Marat identified the Societe de 1789 not with enlightened philosophizing, but with the most partisan of political activities, a secret conspiracy to promote the favoured members of that institution into the ministry.
The opponents of the Societe de 1789 did not hesitate to attack the club for its stand on the Nancy affair. In Revolutions de France et Brabant Desmoulins, certainly no supporter of the club earlier in the summer, viciously attacked in the club for its congratulatory message to the municipality of Nancy: 'on sait que le Club de 89 recut avec des cris de joie la nouvelle du massacre de Nanci, de 3000 Francais, qui supplioient, ce sont les termes du proces verbal de Castella et de Vigier, d'entendre leurs propositions de soumission'.
8 ' Desmoulins expressed outrage at being named one of the ecrivains sanguinaires 90 by the moderates of the Societe, and declared that their support for the violent repression at Nancy revealed them as the 'men of blood'. He drove this point home to his readers by " J-P. Marat, 'Infernal projet des ennemis de la Revolution', Les pamphlets de Marat, ed. C. Vellay (1911) Robespierre argued that the aristocrats of the Societe de 1789 speculated on the Revolution in France rather than opting for the reaction at Koblenz. This, he suggested, was as dangerous as the external enemies, but more inscrutable and harder to detect. 95 The radical attacks homed in on the Societe's most vulnerable points: the elite composition of the club and the perception that it supported counter-revolutionary measures which would halt the extent of the Revolution.
The presence of a large number of bankers led to other, seemingly wellfounded, charges. Desmoulins suggested that the fiscal policies supported by many of the members of the Societe de 1789 were an attempt to profit from the Revolution. Club members opposed issuing small assignats, Camille argued, because they wanted to profit from the nationalized property of the clergy:" In fact, the charge that many members of the Societe de 1789 had direct financial interest in the operation of a national bank was not so very far from the truth, for many of the club's members stood to benefit from Necker's original plan to establish the Caisse d'Escompte as a national bank in Paris. The conversion of the Caisse d'Escompte into a kind of national bank would have guaranteed the profits of stockholders and adminstrators, a number of whom became members of the Societe de 1789-A case in point is Jean-Jacques Lecouteulx du Molay who was Tun des principaux banquiers de Paris' 98 and had been an administrator of the Caisse d'Escompte from 1778. Similarly, Jean-Baptiste Vandenyver was on the administrative council of the Caisse from 1789 to 1792, and his eldest son had been involved from 1778. Given the instability of contemporary fiscal arrangements, it is not surprising that a number of papers read to the Societe de 1789 concerned the organization of state finances. This intense interest in the financial affairs of the government was due, in large part, to the direct interest which many of the members had in the details of the organization of the nation's fiscal affairs. Indeed, there may have been a concerted effort by a number of bankers and financiers to influence the most important members of the Societe de 1789 to support measures in which they had direct financial interest.
The liberal and pro-American sympathies of notable members of the Societe were also used against the club by conservative critics. In June 1790, there appeared an anonymous pamphlet carrying the title By preaching equality and liberty, it was said that the Americans believed that they could increase their population and strength at the expense of the European powers; this was 'le projet de soumettre l'ancien au nouveau monde'. 101 Already this conspiracy had destroyed France and, by implication, upset the balance of power in Europe. The author argued that proAmerican propaganda had tricked the people:
102
Les monstres! Us ont egare le peuple par deux mots qui l'ont toujours rendu la dupe des fourbes = egalite, & desobeissance = l'un, ils le lui ont presente comme un droit naturel; l'autre, comme un moyen legitime d'y rentrer. = II ne connoit pas, ce malheureux peuple, le pouvoir magique de ces deux mots, qui ont couvert la terre de crimes & de sang.
To this denunciation the author appended a slightly annotated copy of the first ten pages of Sieyes's Ebauche d'un nouveau plan de Societe patriotique under the title Plan de la societe pretendue patriotique, qui s'est formee a Paris, sous le nom de Club de la Propagande. The author of this denunciation of an American 'conspiracy' implicated the Societe de 1789 as one of the associations through which this dangerous ideology would be propagated.
The Societe de 1789 was thus attacked by radicals and conservatives, with the most devastating comments coming from writers such as Robespierre, Marat, Prudhomme and Desmoulins. They attacked the club for its elite composition, its support for conservative measures, association with financiers who stood to benefit from the disorder of Revolutionary finances, and the number of members connected with the ancien regime bureaucracy. The waves of critical commentary by popular writers were highly effective. By the late autumn of 1790, the club was discredited among many deputies in the National Assembly and in popular opinion.
VI
On 4 December 1790, L'Atni des Patriotes carried a long discussion of the failure of 1789 club. The anonymous author expressed surprise that the club had missed so many opportunities to exercise influence and gave a perceptive account of its failings. The significance of this 'post mortem' is that it appeared in a journal edited by Adrien Duquesnoy, with the cooperation of Francois-Emmanuel Toulongeon, both of whom were members of the Societe, 103 suggesting that it represented an analysis of the failure of the club by certain of its most influential members.
The author argued that the Societe de 1789 had been well attended by deputies soon after its foundation, but that by late 1790 the club attracted very few members of the National Assembly to its discussions. Thus a decline occurred despite the great advantages which the Societe had over all of the other clubs, including 'une tres-grande independance, une liberte illimitee d'opinion; chacun y pense a sa maniere, & nul commande la pensee de son voisin'. 104 This freedom attracted many among 'les hommes le plus eclaires' of the capital and foreign visitors to Paris as well as individuals distinguished by birth and status, but the club became unpopular in spite of the fact that 'elle compte parmi ses membres les hommes qui ont dicte le plus de decrets a l'assemblee'.
The article identified many reasons for the decline of the Societe de 1789. The club publicly announced its establishment 'pour lutter contre les aristocrates & les factieux' but had never attacked conservatives with nearly the vigour with which it had attacked the radicals. The author complained that 'ils ont fait le decret sur la paix & la guerre; . . . ils ont forme l'opinion publique sur l'affaire de Nancy; mais a des intrigues actives & soutenues, ils n'ont ordinairement oppose que des plaintes et des regrets'.
10S Even more damaging was the club's failure to act with resolution: they never demonstrated real character in difficult circumstances. The club had little influence and did not deserve any because 'elle s'est constamment conduite avec foiblesse & gaucherie pour attaquer des ennemis qui ont de l'audace & de l'adresse . . . il faut qu'elle veuille avec fierte & fermete pour produire de bons effets'.
106 Furthermore, the selection of members was too limited and the club admitted too many indivduals 'connus par leurs principes peu populaires, & par leurs liaisons avec les ministres anciens'. Wealthy men had been selected, in part to maintain the club in its lavish surroundings. Even in these times of turmoil, the author continued, the discussions avoided practical politics: nearly all the discussions 'roulent sur des questions metaphysiques'. Finally, the organization of the club itself was called into question: 107 II est certain que la composition mSme de cette societe est la cause principale pour la quelle on ne la frequente pas. II est difficile d'imaginer qu'on fondera jamais une societe populaire, quand il faudra payer cinq louis pour y dtre admis, quand ses seances se tiendront dans un local tres-bien decore, quand on y gardera des formes de politesse a charge dans tous les temps & dans tous les lieux, mais sur-tout dans un temps de revolution, dans un club de revolution.
The old forms of sociability could no longer coexist in the new political culture, a point which the editor of L'Ami made again several months later. Commenting on the differences between the Jacobins and the 1789 club, he wrote: 'les jacobins font un parti; quelle que soit l'opinion qu'on doit concevoir de plusieurs membres de 1789, il est au moins certain que la societe ne fait pas un parti, & que pourvu qu'on y professe l'amour de la liberte & le respect pour les lois, on y est bien venu'.' 08 Underlying the author's commentary was his surprise and consternation that the most enlightened and influential members of the Parisian and French elite proved to be unable to establish an effective opposition to the Jacobins or to make a significant impact on the political alignments in 1790.
The comments in L'Ami des Patriotes in December 1790 suggest that some members of the Societe de 1789 were aware of the club's most important failings. These ranged from the failure of the leadership properly to exploit the club's strengths to the suggestion that the old forms of political organization were simply inadequate to the new realities of the Revolution. The article suggested that the club was still capable of being useful to the patriots' cause, but this was probably unrealistic, given the stinging indictment of the failures of the Societe de 1789-Moreover, the editors of L'Ami des Patriotes had to establish their own journal to express the moderate patriot opinion which they accused the Societe of failing to propagate. Observers such as Camille Desmoulins, who believed at one point that the success of many members of the Societe de 1789 in the municipal and departmental administration was a sign of its influence, confirmed the sentiment expressed in L'Ami des Patriotes that the club was finished. Revolutions de Paris declared in late November 1790 that les veritables patriotes sauront empecher que le Club de 89 ne renaisse de ses cendres'. founders, Condorcet and Sieves, back to the Jacobins in early 1791. The papers published by the club ceased to appear in February 1791 and there is little documentation concerning the club from the winter of 1791 until its dissolution. The funeral procession of Mirabeau, for example, was the occasion of a public appearance of the club," 0 but there were few such instances. Mazzei suggests that the club continued to meet through the summer of 1791, reporting to Stanislaus of events that occurred outside of the club on 17 July 1791."' By the spring of 1791, however, the club ceased to exercise an impact on Parisian opinion and withered away without significant notice.
The failure of the Societe de 1789 was not merely political, however, but came from the basic assumptions concerning liberal politics that can be found in the organization of the club. The Societe de 1789 was patterned after the institutions of the ancien regime, such as the academies, to which many members of the club had belonged. The membership of the Societe de 1789 was blind to the development of mass politics. The presentation of scholarly discussion papers to a small, elite group of influential individuals was an essential mechanism of reform during the ancien regime, but was ill adapted to the new Revolution. Grouvelle's view that in complicated matters, weighing of opinions rather than counting votes would result in better decisions underlies the constitution of the Societe de 1789. It was this adherence to old forms of political discourse and political sociability which prevented the Societe from recognizing and responding to the political culture being developed in the Jacobin clubs and in the sections of Paris. Indeed, the emphasis placed by the club on the role of reason in politics legitimated the existence of elite groups who would lead the political process.
The membership of the club had considerable experience in the government of the ancien regime. Indeed, this experience was not limited to the bureaucrats, lawyers and financiers who made up a substantial portion of the membership of the club. Rather, many of the intellectuals in the Societe de 1789, such as Du Pont de Nemours, Condorcet and Lavoisier, had extensive experience in government. The typical assertion that the Enlightenment was an abstract and impractical movement was not true of the generation of Philosophes and their proteges who took control of the academies and the bureaucracy. The expertise of late Enlightenment intellectuals was a potential asset for a reforming monarchy. Furthermore, a large proportion of the members of the Societe de 1789 had experience dealing with the government, in the financial services supporting the Crown, the judiciary, and even the military. The politics they learned, however, was that of the bureaucracy and corridors of influence. Condorcet's positions in the Academy and the Mint, for example, were a consequence of the patronage of famous and powerful men -Turgot and d'Alembert in his case -who lobbied other influential men in the bureaucracy and cultural institutions. The very success of some Enlightenment figures, from Turgot's administration onwards, in infiltrating the monarchy of the ancien regime contributed to their failure in the Revolution: they proved to be unable to adapt rapidly enough to the new political culture developed in the Jacobins and the Parisian sections. If it can be said that the intellectuals of the 1789 club were adept in bureaucratic politics, it comes as no surprise that the financiers and lawyers who joined the Societe were even more comfortable in dealing with the monarchy before the Revolution. As men who exercised influence and power within many of the arenas of royal government, the members of the Societe de 1789 learned to their cost that the nature of politics had changed dramatically with the formation of the National Assembly and the creation of political clubs in Paris.
